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Immi Tallgren*
Tokyo Trial is a historical TV series on the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East in Tokyo. Its heroes are the audacious dissenting judges Pal and
5 Ro¨ling—a rare choice that seems to point to a critical counter-narrative of inter-
national criminal justice. This article suggests multiple readings of Tokyo Trial
that open up historiographical and ideological struggles beneath the tropes of
an entertaining ‘docu-drama’.
10
Non, tu n’as rien vu a` . . . Tokyo
What did the birth of international criminal justice look like? On screen, it
typically takes the shape of the International Military Tribunal sitting at
15 Nuremberg from 1945 to 1946. In the miraculously orderly courthouse, erected
on the ashes of an empire gone wrong, the mythical ‘Nuremberg legacy’ for the
future is established. The good and evil sides of the story are immediately
recognisable, eyes wide shut. The Nuremberg trial is emblematic of the mount-
ing drive, as World War II ended, to establish ‘a peace which will afford to all
20 nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which
will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in
freedom from fear and want’.1 For the Allies, that peace would need to re-
establish the distinction between just and unjust violence, and it would do so
through criminal trials.
25 Tokyo Trial is a miniseries of four episodes directed by Pieter Verhoeff and
Rob King that brings into view a different historical setting for this familiar
theme.2 As the chief prosecutor, Joseph Keenan, stated in his opening statement
* Research Fellow, Erik Castre´n Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of
Helsinki and Senior Visiting Fellow, Centre for International Studies, London School of
Economics and Political Science. Email: i.tallgren@lse.ac.uk. For inspiration, suggestions and
comments, my warmest thanks to Antoine Buchet, Olivier Corten, Parvathi Menon, Gerry
Simpson, Sofia Stolk, Yuma Totani, and Urs Matthias Zachmann, as well as the reviewers and
editors of the London Review of International Law.
1 Declaration of Principles Issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, 14 August 1941, para. 6 (‘Atlantic Charter’).
2 Tokyo Trial, dir. P Verhoeff & R King (2016).
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at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo: ‘we
are waging a part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the entire
world from destruction’.3 Although not unknown to international lawyers or
historians, the events featured are far less frequently represented on screen than
5 is Nuremberg. Tokyo Trial narrates a period that starts with the arrival of the
first Allied judges of the IMTFE in Tokyo in early 1946 and terminates with
their departure in November 1948. The IMTFE tried 28 former Japanese gen-
erals, admirals and politicians for acts committed between January 1928 and
September 1945. The Tribunal was set up pursuant to the Potsdam
10 Proclamation of 26 July 1945, which declared ‘[w]e do not intend that the
Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice
shall be meted out to all war criminals’.4 Demanding ‘the unconditional sur-
render of all Japanese armed forces’, it threatened: ‘[t]he alternative for Japan is
prompt and utter destruction.’5 The atomic bombing of Hiroshima followed 11
15 days later on 6 August 1945, then Nagasaki. Peace was installed; justice was to
follow.
In January 1946, the Charter of the IMTFE was adopted by General
Douglas MacArthur, head of the Allied occupation in Japan.6 It followed the
example of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of
20 Nuremberg, which formed part of the London Agreement of 1945.7 The
IMTFE had jurisdiction over ‘crimes against peace’, ‘conventional war
crimes’, and ‘crimes against humanity’.8 The accused—with the exception of
three who died during the trial or were declared unfit to stand trial—were all
found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment or death. Seven convicts, includ-
25 ing former Prime Minister of Japan, Hideki Tojo, were hanged.
Tokyo Trial was produced by Japan’s public broadcaster NHK in co-op-
eration with US media giant Netflix. It is thus a mainstream drama, not targeted
at film festivals or the rare aficionados of war crimes trials of the past. Its four
3 RJ Pritchard & SM Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-Two Volumes, vol. 1
(Garland Publishing, 1989) 384 (emphasis added).
4 Proclamation Defining Terms of Japanese Surrender, US–China–UK, signed 26 July 1945, 3 Bevans
1204, para. 10 (‘Potsdam Proclamation’).
5 Ibid para. 13. See also Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, signed 19 January 1946.
6 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, signed 19 January 1946, amended 26
April 1946, TIAS 1589, 4 Bevans 20, 27 (‘Tokyo Charter’).
7 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, signed 8 August 1945 (‘London Agreement’).
8 Tokyo Charter Art. 5.
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episodes—each 45 min in length—start with a statement: ‘The following is
based on true events.’ Such a claim to ‘truth’ is one of the distinctive qualities
of the genres of the ‘biopic’9 and ‘docudrama’.10 (I will return to this point
below.) Tokyo Trial makes use of visual techniques and choices of setting fa-
5 miliar from countless historical dramas put on screen. Actors carry the names
and mimic the appearance of historical characters. Film footage from archives is
combined with new images in black and white, with intercuts so tight that, at
times, the film almost succeeds in immersing its actors in the images of events
back in time. This skilful use of digital technologies, which creates the delusive
10 impression of ‘being there’, underlines at the same time the artefactual nature of
the series, as a construction rather than a representation, an audio-visual com-
modity for consumption in the 2010s. Yet, in contrast with the near seamless
collage of its high-tech production, the plot of Tokyo Trial is linear, other than a
few exceptional moments, and the mise-en-sce`ne is conventional and visually
15 unsurprising. These choices are presumably aiming at ‘realism, with illusionist
simulation of real-world experiences and emotions’, still the ‘privileged mode
of discourse’ of cinema and television productions of the past as Steve Anderson
has argued.11
Since the end of the Second World War (WWII), there has been a wealth of
20 fictional films, TV-series, and documentaries on the (‘international’) criminal
responsibility for Nazi crimes. On screen, the IMT itself often appears melded
with some of the 10 American trials based on Control Council Law No 1012 that
took place in the same courtroom, since documentary film footage and details
have been used without much historical precision. The first representation was
25 Orson Welles’s The Stranger (1946), the most famous is undoubtedly Stanley
Kramer’s Judgment at Nuremberg (1961) on the trial of the Nazi lawyers, and the
most recent include the TV series Nuremberg (2000). In 1961, the Eichmann
trial in Israel, again dealing with Nazi crimes, attracted unprecedented media
interest. Several recent films have been produced on that trial, using the film
30 archives of the trial in various formats.13
9 See, e.g., GF Custen, Bio/Pics: How Hollywood Constructed Public History (Rutgers UP, 1992).
10 See, e.g., A Rosenthal (ed.), Why Docudrama? Fact-Fiction on Film and TV (Southern Illinois UP,
1999).
11 SF Anderson, Technologies of History: Visual Media and the Eccentricity of the Past (Dartmouth
College Press, 2011) 5.
12 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity’,
Control Council Law No 10, 20 December 1945, 3 Official Gazette of the Control Council for
Germany (1946) 50.
13 See, e.g., The Specialist, dir. E Sivan & R Braumann (1999); Henchman Glance, dir. C Marker (2010);
Hannah Arendt, dir. M von Trotta (2012); The Eichmann Show, dir. PA Williams (2015).
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In comparison, the IMTFE has attracted relatively little attention from
filmmakers. In Japan, The Great East Asia War and the International Tribunal
(1958) and Shunya Ito’s Pride (1998) both provide a sympathetic vision of the
accused. A Japanese documentary, The Tokyo Trial (1983) by Masaki
5 Kabayashi, became very popular in its home country.14 A recent Chinese
film, The Tokyo Trial by Qunshu Gao (2006), presents the trial from the
point of view of the Chinese judge Mei Ju-ao. Even less often seen on screen
are the great number of criminal trials of Japanese held in a variety of countries
based on national legislation, including in the US, the UK, China, Singapore,
10 Australia, the Philippines and the Netherlands. To mention a rare example,
Takashi Koizumi’s Best Wishes for Tomorrow (2007) features the trial of
Lieutenant General Tasuku Okada in Yokohama. Australian trials on the treat-
ment of POWs in Indonesia are depicted in Blood Oath (Stephen Wallace, 1990).
More broadly, WWII as experienced in Asia and the Pacific, has, of course, been
15 the subject of numerous films, series, and documentaries.15 Many films also
address acts we would today label as ‘international crimes’, and the moral, pol-
itical or legal responsibility for them. However, the European theatre of war, and
Nazi criminality during and preceding it, have attracted much more interest
from producers and directors, as well as from scholars and the public.16
20 Similarly, the IMTFE and the other Pacific trials are typically not taken
into account in the growing recent scholarship on international (criminal) law
and film, an interdisciplinary field with interesting contributions by scholars of
law, history, film, and media studies.17 Topics much discussed with regard to
14 See, e.g., M Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice (Routledge, 2008) 80-82; D
Middleton, ‘Film: The Tokyo Trial’, New York Times, 25 September 1985.
15 These include: The Bridge on the River Kwai, dir. D Lean (1957); Hiroshima mon amour, dir. A
Resnais (1959); Hell in the Pacific, dir. J Boorman (1968); Children of Nagasaki, dir. K Kinoshita
(1983); Merry Xmas Mr Lawrence, dir. N Oshima (1983); Black Rain, dir. S Imamura (1989); The
Thin Red Line, dir. T Malick (1998); Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II, dir.
L Rees & M Balazova (2000); Pearl Harbour, dir. M Bay (2001); Don’t Cry, Nanking, dir. W Ziniu
(1995); Nanking, dir. B Guttentag & D Sturman (2007); The Rape of Nanking, dir. S Viallet (2007);
City of Life and Death, dir. L Chuan (2009); Letters from Iwo-Jima, dir. C Eastwood (2006); The
Pacific, dir. J Podeswa et al. (2010).
16 It suffices to think of Nuit et broulliard, dir. A Resnais (1956); Sophie’s Choice, dir. A Pakula (1982);
Shoah, dir. C Lanzmann (1985); Music Box, dir. C Costa-Gavras (1989); Schindler’s List, dir. S
Spielberg (1993); La vita e bella, dir. R Benigni (1998); The Pianist, dir. R Polanski (2002); Son of
Saul, dir. L Nemes (2016).
17 They are not discussed in key works such as C Delage, Caught on Camera (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2014); C Vismann, Medien der Rechtsprechung (Fischer, 2011); L Douglas,
The Memory of Judgement (Yale UP, 2001); U Weckel, Bescha¨mende Bilder (Frank Steiner Verlag,
2012); P Rush & O Simic´ (eds), The Arts of Transitional Justice (Springer, 2014); LJ Moran et al.
(eds), Law’s Moving Image (GlassHouse Press, 2005); C Delage & P Goodrich (eds), The Scene of
Mass Crime (Routledge, 2013), or amongst the presentations at the LSE seminar ‘International
Criminal Justice and/on Film’, 12-13 September 2016. A Lagerwall, ‘Quand la justice pe´nale
4 Tallgren:Watching Tokyo Trial
the Nuremberg trials—such as the elaborate prosecutorial strategies and ad-
justments to courtroom design developed to introduce filmed recordings of
atrocities into the trials themselves, as evidence, but also as a means of shaming
the accused by confronting them with their deeds18—seem to have attracted
5 little scholarly attention in the case of the IMTFE.
Tokyo Trial is thus a rare event and very welcome. In this review essay,
I analyse Tokyo Trial with particular attention to two attributes. The first is
the rare choice of judges as the main protagonists. In contrast to typical
‘courtroom dramas’, where judges figure as public actors in a wider narrative
10 of a criminal trial where the focus typically is on its other actors, the em-
phasis in Tokyo Trial is on the judges’ own confidential deliberations, their
informal encounters, and their conflicts. The struggle to arrive at judgments
in order to terminate the lengthy trial forms the only truly dramatic twist
within the series. The function of an international criminal judge is, on the
15 one hand, represented as the height of independent individual agency, moral
discernment, and historical importance. As Justice Henri Bernard from
France articulates it: ‘we are here to decide what is best for humanity’
(episode 2). On the other hand, the manoeuvring and politicking by the
majority judges make them appear calculating if not outright conspiratorial.
20 This contrast between an idealised and a critical ‘realpolitik’ view of inter-
national judges raises questions. Idolised as sculptors of the future of
humanity, judges are also denuded humans: vain, calculating, hesitant,
struggling, bored, and ailing individuals. Vested with the power to adjudi-
cate a war that touched the lives of hundreds of millions, ‘writing a much
25 needed history of events which otherwise would not have been written’,19
how do judges really do it? What is there to see?
The second matter I address is how and why Tokyo Trial goes against
recent cinematographic and scholarly attention, much of which is guided by
its advocacy for a ‘fight against impunity’, the unquestioned value of organising
30 (international) criminal trials. In Tokyo Trial, the heroes are, by contrast, the
dissenting judges—the ones who question and doubt. Against all odds, they try
to make sense of the broader context of the law they are nominated to apply, the
jurisdiction they are called upon to exercise. I analyse how the series emphasises
the complexity and challenges of international criminal justice. It brings a
internationale tient le premier roˆle’, in O Corten & F Dubuisson (eds), Du droit international au
cine´ma (Pedone, 2015) 241, 259-60 discusses, in passing, The Emperor, dir. P Webber (2012).
18 As Ulrike Weckel suggests: Weckel (2012). On the IMT courtroom and screen, see Delage (2014);
Visman (2011).
19 AF Mignone, ‘After Nuremberg, Tokyo’ 25 Texas Law Review (1947) 475, 490.
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politics into view, echoing not only the oft-heard critique that international
criminal trials merely instantiate a ‘victor’s justice’ but also providing a thor-
oughly critical perspective on international law’s colonial underpinnings. This
theme was, of course, of burning topicality at the time of the Nuremberg and
5 Tokyo trials. But too often it gets hidden in progressive historical narratives of
international criminal justice today. In this sense, Tokyo Trial can be read as an
anti-celebration of the birth of international criminal justice, a critical ‘counter-
narrative’ which brings into the picture doubt and anxiety about the possibility
of an alternative, a road not taken: what if Justice Radhabinod Pal or Justice
10 Bert Ro¨ling were right? Yet, isn’t Tokyo Trial, as I argue, far too ambivalent to be
read merely as a critique of international criminal justice, its past and future?
Tokyo Trial—broadcast in Japan on 12–15 December 2016, exactly a week after
the 75th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbour—is also an intervention
into the sediment of historiographical and ideological struggles, in fractured
15 social and political temporalities that are ‘post-colonial’ in different senses of
the word, both local and global. Underneath its somewhat clumsy historical
TV-drama tropes, Tokyo Trial relays complex messages that deserve not to get
lost in translation.
SPOTLIGHT ON JUDGES
20 Many films about international criminal trials focus on prosecution and inves-
tigation. There is typically some sort of suspense relating to the investigation
and capture of suspects, or the dilemmas of deciding on the charges. In contrast,
the prosecution, headed by the American Joseph Keenan, is not very visible in
Tokyo Trial. The defence counsel—the prosecution’s counterpart in the pri-
25 marily US-inspired adversarial criminal procedure—are also represented at a
distance. Both sides appear only in archival footage of the IMTFE courtroom.
The accused are likewise represented only through archival footage and photo-
graphs. They remain mainly a collective, with the exception of Foreign Minister
Togo and Prime Minister Tojo. The victims of the crimes, too, are largely absent
30 (apart from a couple of intercut scenes of victim-witness testimony).
The stars of Tokyo Trial are the judges, and the suspense develops around
the preparation of the judgment. For much of the time, the camera observes the
judges’ in camera deliberations, or features them on the bench in the courtroom
of the former Japanese military academy at Ichigaya in central Tokyo.20 For
20 See, e.g., Y Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II
(Harvard UP, 2008) 8-10; AC Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War
Crimes Trials (Fontana/Collins, 1990).
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more intimate encounters the favoured set is the imposing Imperial Hotel,
designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, where the judges were staying. The hotel
restaurant and bar are the settings for scenes of innumerable meals and
drinks (even if most of the series was filmed in less pricey Lithuania). Several
5 key scenes also take place in the privacy of hotel rooms where the judges work,
write letters, and relax, and where they occasionally pay each other surprise
visits. With the solitary scenes of a judge, Tokyo Trial faces the challenge of
rendering visually and narratively captivating, a static and introverted activity:
intellectual legal work. Just how much drama can one make out of a man sitting
10 with a typewriter at a desk, blowing out smoke—even if accompanied by a
tumultuous sound-track? In Hannah Arendt, director Margarethe von Trotta
used many similar static images of a smoking woman in deep contemplation to
depict the tormented creation of Eichmann in Jerusalem and (miraculously
perhaps) the tension of those moments—when the drama takes place only in
15 an intellectual’s mind—did successfully come through. Regrettably, however,
this miracle rarely occurs in Tokyo Trial.
Potentially more promising are the other recurrent scenes where judges
nervously face each other across the prestigious room in which their deliber-
ations take place. The constant smoking (again), zoom-ins on serious faces torn
20 by internal struggles, and shot/reverse shots of verbal encounters stand in for
the intensity of legal arguments. Other visual elements are scarce, mainly com-
prising changes of attire and the movement of characters around the table,
helping themselves to tea or nervously traipsing around the room. It is impos-
sible not to be reminded of Twelve Angry Men (Sidney Lumet, 1957). In that
25 classic film, the claustrophobic tension and suspense of a jury’s decision-
making in a murder trial in New York are created with a single set. Behind
the locked door, in a room with a large wooden table (and the neighbouring
restroom), the jury members nervously alternate between sitting and standing
postures, pacing round the table, smoking, wiping away sweat, and fumbling
30 with their notebooks, pens or wallets. The spectator is drawn into the escalating
struggle among the jury members through a rhythmic interchange of close-ups.
The pressure and the heat of New York communicate the weightiness of decid-
ing a man’s life. In Tokyo Trial, the pace is less intense. The spectator is con-
stantly permitted to escape the room, travelling from a hotel suite to the
35 courtroom and the hotel restaurant before re-entering the deliberations. In
the courtroom scenes, archival material is skilfully intercut with black and
white remakes. The spectator gets a sense of the routine of the Tribunal, the
vast room, the distance of the actors from each other, and the dragging verbal
communication via interpretation. The IMTFE trial lasted for 417 courtroom
40 days, and the transcript of the proceedings totalled 48 412 pages. The mist of the
accumulating fatigue and frustration reach the spectator of Tokyo Trial as the
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episodes go by. One might wonder what Rebecca West—given her quip about
‘the citadel of boredom’ at the (much shorter) Nuremberg IMT trial21—would
have made of the IMTFE.
Among the 11 judges, the focus is on two, in particular. They are the
5 prominent dissidents of the bench: Justice Pal from India (played by the
Bollywood star Irrfan Khan of Slumdog Millionaire fame (Danny Boyle,
2008)) and Justice Ro¨ling from the Netherlands (played by Marcel
Hensema). Both Pal and Ro¨ling provided influential, at least in hindsight,
dissenting opinions.22 The road to these opinions forms the core intrigue of
10 Tokyo Trial. Why should Ro¨ling feel the need to re-open what had just been
decided by another Allied court at Nuremberg on crimes against peace? And
how to explain the Indian judge boldly acquitting all the accused, even though
he claimed not to condone the atrocities? The series narrates these legal issues
mainly in terms of Pal’s and Ro¨ling’s confrontation with the judges nomi-
15 nated by the UK, the US, Canada, and New Zealand. Those four Justices—
Lord William Patrick (Paul Freeman), General Myron C Cramer (Tim
Ahern), Edward Stuart McDougall (Stephen McHattie) and Erima Harvey
Northcroft (Julian Wadham)—are united in their defence of what might be
termed the ‘Western’ point of view, made flesh in the Nuremberg legacy, and
20 in their support for the US goal of seeking closure for the Pearl Harbour
attack.
Another pole of tension is represented through the President of the
Tribunal, the Australian Sir William Webb, Chief Justice of the State of
Queensland (Jonathan Hyde). Dismay at President Webb’s comportment,
25 and the conflicts that arise between him and several of the other judges, is a
major point of intrigue. Yet, its causes and twists may remain mysterious to
anyone without prior knowledge of the events. Justice Webb, described as
‘coarse, ill-tempered and highly opinionated’23 in Tokyo, does come across as
incompetent, and often frustrated by his struggles between General MacArthur,
30 the other judges (not convinced by his presidency), and his own government
(itself under pressure from the other Allies). But that does not quite suffice to
generate dramatic tension. What does President Webb really want? Where does
he stand? The spectator of Tokyo Trial receives no answer.
21 R West, A Train of Powder (Viking Press, 1955) 3.
22 The judgment was far from unanimous: it consisted of three dissenting opinions (in addition to
Justices Pal and Ro¨ling, Justice Bernard dissented), a separate opinion (Justice Webb) and a con-
curring opinion (Justice Jaranilla).
23 J Pritchard, ‘An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial’, Nissan Institute of
Japanese Studies, Occasional Paper Series No 5 (1987) 17.
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The Chinese judge Mei Ju-ao (David Tse) and the Soviet judge, General
Ivan Zaryanov (Kestutis Stasys Jakstas) are represented in a rather sympa-
thetic light as individual judges with their own peculiarities, also stemming
from the political contexts of their nations. Mei insists on a seating arrange-
5 ment that gives him a prominent place among the victorious developed na-
tions sitting in judgement over their cruel Japanese aggressors. He must
render a judgment that honours China: ‘I want to be sure that what I
decide for Asia is good . . . and also seen as fair by the rest of the world. So
I am joining the majority’ (Mei, episode 4). Zaryanov is featured as a carica-
10 tured Soviet General proposing vodka toasts and making clumsy jokes, sur-
prising only in ‘upholding Stalin’s policy to abandon the death penalty’
(episode 4)—an apparent reversal of the Soviet stance at Nuremberg, where
they strongly supported capital punishment. The first US judge, John P
Higgins, soon leaves for home, frustrated, and is replaced by General
15 Myron C Cramer. Interestingly, the Soviets and the Americans both send
hard-boiled military judges. They are united in their view that the end-goal
counts more than legal argument. The French judge Henri Bernard (Serge
Hazanavicius) comes across as a passionate and tormented side-figure tar-
nished by his adherence to the ideology of the Western civilizing mission: ‘I
20 still believe colonialism can be good, in places where people lack a civilized
government and a decent way of life’ (episode 3). The Philippine judge
Colonel Delfı´n Jaranilla (Bert Matias) is represented as an exotic elderly char-
acter marked by his suffering at the hands of the Japanese (the Bataan ‘death
march’ of 1942, and the destruction of Manila), and struggling with a personal
25 quest for vengeance.
Little is seen of Tokyo or Japan in Tokyo Trial, apart from a couple of
excursions to sites of worship or to the seaside, the latter by a Justice Ro¨ling
homesick for the Dutch shores. Unlike other films of the genre, for example on
the Nuremberg trials, which typically use concentration camp footage, Tokyo
30 Trial makes scarce and sober use of images of violence and suffering. The scene
is set with archival images: the nuclear mushroom cloud in the sky, an aerial
attack (on what looks like Pearl Harbour), and a passing close-up of civilians’
bodies on a street (presumably footage from Nanking). In the new takes for
Tokyo Trial, occupiers’ cars crawl through burned rubble and shacks represent-
35 ing post-war Tokyo. Very little is shown of the victims of Japanese war crimes:
no POW camps or marches, no Kamikazes sinking ships at sea. Apart from a
minute at the beginning of the first episode, there is no visual allusion to the
enormity of the massacres in China or in The Philippines. There are no hints of
the widespread sexual violence at all. And one sees few images of the imperial
40 Japanese army. Tokyo Trial is very prudish about the debris of war. Is this
merely a discreet choice of style and tone so the audience is not forced to
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consume the ‘pornography of pain’?24 Or does the prudishness of the directors
and producers stand for something else? I will return to these questions.
Nor is the viewer’s attention directed to romance or sex. What comes
closest is a side-story of Ro¨ling’s passion for classical music, and his encounters
5 with an attractive blonde virtuoso pianist, something of a cliche´d character,
combining blunt, authoritative behaviour and German origin. If Justice
Ro¨ling’s youngest son Hugo’s recent biographical book is to be taken as an
authority here, the series is not ‘based on true events’ in this regard.25 Be that as
it may, the scenes of the empathetic but cautious Ro¨ling conversing with the
10 dramatic German blonde seem to recall the legendary scenes of Judgment at
Nuremberg between the US President of the Tribunal (Spencer Tracy) and an
enticing German general’s widow (Marlene Dietrich).26 Romance lovers might
regret that Ro¨ling’s encounters with the pianist fall short of the electricity of the
original cinematographic reference. In fact, it is not heterosexual romance
15 alone, but women in general, that remain at the margins of the series. They
figure in the roles of servants, bikini contest participants, and family members
of the accused at the Tribunal. Apart from the Soviet judge’s somewhat bleak
but astute interpreter, and a few young women glimpsed typing up the judg-
ment, no professional women appear in Tokyo Trial. International criminal
20 justice in Tokyo is shown as exclusively a man’s world. This is not far from
the ‘true events’.27
DISSENTERS AS HEROES
Above all else, our profession is meant to interpret laws, which, by
their very nature, can be understood in different ways. And nothing is
25 more important than the reasons for that interpretation. (Ro¨ling,
episode 4)
The IMTFE was an ad hoc criminal tribunal created after the alleged
crimes it was established to judge, and based on arguably retroactive criminal
law, apart from ‘conventional war crimes’. Its only precedent was the
30 Nuremberg IMT, which was still in session as the IMTFE judges gathered in
Tokyo. At the time, the word ‘international’ in the Tribunal’s title did not carry
24 K Halttunen, ‘Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture’ 100
American Historical Review (1995) 303.
25 H Ro¨ling, De rechter die geen ontzag had: Bert Ro¨ling en het Tokiotribunaal (Wereldbibliotheek, 2014)
198-201.
26 Ibid.
27 For an exception, see, e.g., S Tabak, ‘Grace Kanode Llewellyn: Local Portia at the Tokyo War Crimes
Tribunal’ International and Comparative Law Perspectives (Fall, 2013) 7.
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the universalist or consensualist connotations that the International Criminal
Court (ICC), with over 120 ratifications, arguably has today.28 The IMTFE was
established by the Allies, the victors in the war, and—in their perception at
least—also the main victims of the war. The judges were nominated by their
5 home states and so were on the bench without having been elected. Those states
were committed to the Allies’ agreements and declarations on ending the war,
the tone of which left little doubt as to the mission of the judges: ‘There must be
eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived
and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest’.29
10 That Ro¨ling—a criminal law expert from the civil law tradition—should
feel troubled by such a setting is hardly surprising. Where is the loyalty of an
‘international’ judge to lie? This is the question Tokyo Trial asks. Should it be to
the home state that nominated him, and its political decision-makers and the
expectations of its ‘public opinion’? Or to his personal understanding and in-
15 terpretation of the ‘law in force’ according to his own private convictions? In
Tokyo Trial, most of the judges are shown not to face a conflict. Either their
convictions correspond to the mission they have, or they manage to suppress
any internal conflict. There is widely shared dismay at General MacArthur’s
decision not to involve Emperor Hirohito in the trial—the topic of another
20 recent mainstream film.30 President Webb’s disagreement on this point cul-
minates in his separate opinion. But most of the judges are shown to suppress
their doubts. The plot focuses on the judges—Pal and Ro¨ling—who expose
their torment as they enter into conflicts, whether vis-a`-vis their home state, the
colonial rulers of their home country, or the Allies as the self-nominated mas-
25 ters of a ‘new order’ in the guise of international law.31
The attention to Ro¨ling and Pal may at the simplest be traced back to the
producers, directors and, in particular, the four authors of the screenplay: Rob
King, Max Mannix, Toru Takagi, and Kees van Beijnum (the latter the author of
the novel De offers, itself purportedly influenced by Hugo Ro¨ling’s writing).32
30 The financial and intellectual forces behind the series thus include a strong
Japanese and Dutch component. Beyond that, the antagonistic relations of a
hero (or two heroes) with members of a given community is a typical pose in
28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July
2002, 2187 UNTS 90.
29 Potsdam Proclamation para. 6.
30 The Emperor, dir. P Webber (2012).
31 Potsdam Proclamation para. 6.
32 K van Beijnum, De offers (De Bezige Bij, 2014).
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the genre of the biopic.33 As Bertolt Brecht noted, ‘[t]he element of conflict in
these bourgeois biographies derives from the opposition between the hero and
the dominant opinion, which is to say the opinion of those who dominate.’34
The plot, casting Ro¨ling and Pal as the heroes of the story, is again rem-
5 iniscent of Twelve Angry Men. In that film, set in a court in New York, the jury
has heard the trial of a youngster from a Hispanic immigrant family with a
history of violent crime. He is accused of murdering his father with a knife.
Both witness testimony and material evidence seem to confirm his guilt. When
the members of the jury retire to consider their verdict, they expect to reach a
10 conclusion quickly. The situation changes when one man (Henry Fonda) suc-
ceeds in planting the seed of ‘a reasonable doubt’. A confrontation unfolds, with
ardent passions aroused both in argument and voting. In Tokyo Trial, it is the
latecomer Pal who first induces doubt, but the more sympathetic and moral
‘Henry Fonda’ character is Ro¨ling. The series depicts Ro¨ling initially as a con-
15 sensus figure, keeping disagreements among the judges confidential. Referring
to his national legal tradition, he argues (supported by Justice Bernard) against
dissenting opinions. Before latecomers Pal and Jaranilla35 join the group, the
judges affirm:
that, as Members of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
20 East, we will duly administer justice, according to law, without fear,
favour or affection, and according to our consciences, and the best of
our understanding and that we will not disclose or discover the vote or
opinion of any particular member of the Tribunal upon the finding or
sentence but will preserve inviolate the secrecy of counsel of every
25 member.36
Pal refuses to accept this position, reached in his absence. He also rejects
head-on the move to uphold the Nuremberg findings on the criminality of
aggressive war. After Pal has exploded the (relative) harmony of the group,
Ro¨ling enters a state of turbulence both internal and external. He is torn: he
33 Custen (1992) 89.
34 T Elsaesser, ‘Film History as Social History: The Dieterle/Warner Brothers Bio-Pic’ 8 Wide Angle
(1986) 15, 24.
35 The US State Department recommended that they be included, ‘since the Tribunal will be trying
Japanese war criminals it is believed that it would strengthen the Tribunal, in the eyes of the peoples
of south Asia, if at least one additional Asiatic nation is represented’. US Department of State,
‘Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the
Secretary of State’ (1 March 1946), in JG Reid & HA Fine (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States,
1946, vol. 8 (US Government Printing Office, 1971) 418, 419.
36 N Boister & R Cryer (eds), Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter,
Indictment and Judgments (Oxford UP, 2008) 701 [46] (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ro¨ling).
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believes in the purity of the interpretation of law by a ‘jurist’ (as he calls him-
self). At the same time, he feels for those who directly suffered from the war—
on both sides—which does not make his task any easier. He must also cope with
a different kind of external pressure than must Pal. His Western origins create
5 the expectation that he should side with the other fellow (white) judges of the
Allies. His government, represented by the head of the liaison office of the
Netherlands in Japan, is not keen to respect his independence: Ro¨ling is
made aware of the consequences of his ‘irresponsible’ action. Firmly and
proudly, Ro¨ling refuses to bend: ‘I see my role as representing more than my
10 own country’ (episode 3). Ro¨ling is also the youngest judge. In Tokyo Trial, this
is dramatically contrasted with his strong character and his personal quest for
justice. Hugo Ro¨ling’s account of his father—a source for the screenplay—
paints his father’s rectitude in no uncertain terms, by reference to Martin
Luther’s (legendary) words: ‘Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise.’37
15 The legal positions that Bert Ro¨ling held at the IMTFE have been subject to
much commentary, (including in his own later work),38 most recently by
Robert Cryer.39 Tokyo Trial reproduces in a succinct manner the key aspects
of Ro¨ling’s views on crimes against peace. His lack of conviction that crimes
against peace existed prior to and during WWII makes it impossible for him to
20 join the seven judges who, in secret, prepare their majority judgment. But it
does not lead him to join Pal’s decision to acquit all the accused of this charge.
‘There is no progress in international law if we let them all go free just because
waging aggressive war was clearly not a crime when Japan went into war’,
Ro¨ling tells Pal (episode 3). Ro¨ling seeks to escape the dilemma by means of
25 his own dissent, taking a roundabout route to arrive at a partial agreement with
the majority on those charges. Even if he holds that crimes against peace were
not criminal per se, his view is that:
There is no doubt that powers victorious in a ‘bellum justum,’ and as
such responsible for peace and order thereafter, have, according to
37 Ro¨ling (2014) 358.
38 See BVA Ro¨ling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger, ed. A Cassese (Polity
Press, 1993).
39 R Cryer, ‘Justice Ro¨ling (The Netherlands)’, in Y Tanaka, T McCormack & G Simpson (eds), Beyond
Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 109. See also L
Schouten, ‘From Tokyo to the United Nations: B.V.A. Ro¨ling, International Criminal Jurisdiction
and the Debate on Establishing an International Criminal Court, 1949–1957’, in M Bergsmo, WL
Cheah & P Yi (eds), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law, vol. 2 (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher, 2014) 177; J Klabbers, ‘Principled Pragmatist: Bert Ro¨ling and the Emergence of
International Criminal Law’, in F Me´gre´t & I Tallgren (eds), The Dawn of a Discipline:
International Criminal Justice and Its Early Exponents (forthcoming, manuscript on file with the
author).
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international law, the right to counteract elements constituting a threat
to that newly established order, and are entitled, as a means of
preventing the recurrence of gravely offensive conduct, to seek and
retain the custody of the pertinent persons. Napoleon’s elimination
5 offers a precedent.40
In Tokyo Trial, Ro¨ling is portrayed overall as a conscientious positivist-legalist,
trying to navigate between what he personally regards as the best solution and what
he believes the law says. Yet, this part of Ro¨ling’s dissent did not accord well with
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege that he wished to defend, if not consecrate—
10 adopting a compromise inspired by the special treatment of ‘political offenders’ in
national law. The rationale behind the nullum crimen maxim he wished to under-
line—i.e., legal certainty and predictability—are not served by deprivation of liberty
for the sake of protection of a society or an ‘order’. As Cryer points out, Ro¨ling’s
escape strategy has not stood the test of time particularly well: ‘[t]he modern
15 resurgence of preventive detention in the “war on terror” shows how perceptions
of danger can be overstated and can lead to disregard of human rights.’41 A legally-
trained viewer of Tokyo Trial might notice some further discrepancies in Ro¨ling’s
legalism, such as his strong support for the death penalty with reference to an ex
post facto Dutch special law re-establishing the death penalty for Nazi collaborators,
20 characterised by him as ‘brought about by unthinkable crimes’ (episode 4).
The evolution and legal reasoning behind Justice Pal’s full-frontal dissent-
ing judgment may remain even more opaque for Tokyo Trial’s audience. Pal is
represented as acting boldly and freely, in a manner both personal and consist-
ent. Yet despite stating that, ‘I do not condone the atrocities’ (episode 2), Pal
25 appears insensitive to the suffering of victims. In his dissent, for example, he
characterises the ‘Bataan death march’ as ‘an isolated instance of cruelty’.42 Pal
is also often absent from the hearings claiming (oddly, given that the trial was
still ongoing) that ‘I need time to work on my judgment’ (episode 3). In Tokyo
Trial, Pal, unlike Ro¨ling, comes to Tokyo with a clear agenda and steady nerves,
30 and executes his plan without equivocation. He disagrees with the majority
both on facts and the law. The Pact of Paris of 1928 (the Kellogg-Briand
Pact)43 ‘does not provide legal ground for criminalising war’ (episode 2).
40 Boister & Cryer (eds) (2008) 701 [46] (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ro¨ling).
41 Cryer (2011) 116.
42 Boister & Cryer (eds) (2008) 665 (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal), quoted in ES Kopelman,
‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes
Tribunal’ 23 New York University Journal of Law and International Politics (1991) 373, 417 note 165.
43 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed 27 August 1928,
entered into force 25 July 1929, 94 LNTS 57 (‘Kellogg-Briand Pact’).
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War is not criminal as such, and even less could the Japanese leaders be shown
to have conspired to start it and become responsible for ‘acts of state’. With
regard to the ‘atrocities’ charged as war crimes and crimes against humanity, Pal
does not deny that some may have taken place. But he remains unconvinced
5 that the defendants had ordered, authorised, or permitted them. Pal declares
that he finds it sufficient that ‘the Japanese officers who committed these
atrocities have been tried in local courts where they took place and have been
given sentences’ (episode 2).
In the early 1990s, Elizabeth S Kopelman analysed Justice Pal’s stated ration-
10 ale for his ‘dissentient’ judgment, providing alternative interpretations to explain
his underlying ideology.44 She proposed a spectrum of mutually non-exclusive
readings of Pal as a positivist, as a ‘radical’, or as an academic. With regard to Pal’s
underlying ideology, Kopelman sketched him alternatively as an anti-ideologue, as
a pan-Asianist, or as articulating a ‘precursor to Third World perspectives on
15 international law’.45 In today’s commentaries, it is not unusual to situate Pal’s
arguments as ‘a subaltern critique of Western international law’,46 making Pal a
forefather of the school of Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL). Pal stands for the rejection of international criminal law as, to quote
Gerry Simpson, one of the tools ‘for stabilising and securing existing power dis-
20 tributions within international society’ and for ensuring that ‘the frontiers created
by the original sin of colonial misdistribution’ remain fixed.47 Pal’s dissent can be
read as a plea for rejecting international criminal law—at least as far as crimes
against peace are concerned—in order not to paralyse the status quo of interna-
tional affairs, and thereby implicitly arrive at ‘the criminalisation of the struggle
25 against colonialism’.48 Latha Varadarajan argues that Pal exposed and rejected the
‘weaving of [a] cloak of universal morality and legal institutionalization over the
older, existing structure of imperialism’.49
The tone and emphasis are different in the fame that Justice Pal and his
‘dissentient’ judgment enjoy in Japan. As Nakijama Takeshı` argues, ‘Pal’s judg-
30 ment’ has been and continues to be instrumentalised for revisionist claims in
post-war Japan.50 Instead of unveiling and denouncing Japanese imperialism,
44 Kopelman (1991).
45 Ibid. 428.
46 S Moyn, ‘Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court’ 4 Humanity (2013) 485.
47 G Simpson, ‘Writing the Tokyo Trial’, in Tanaka, McCormack & Simpson (eds) (2011) 23, 27.
48 K Sellars, ‘Crimes against Peace’ and International Law (Cambridge UP, 2013) 237.
49 L Varadarajan, ‘The Trials of Imperialism: Radhabinod Pal’s Dissent at the Tokyo Tribunal’ 21
European Journal of International Relations (2015) 793, 807.
50 N Takeski, ‘Justice Pal (India)’, in Tanaka, McCormack & Simpson (eds) (2011) 127.
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Pal’s dissent serves to defend the conquest of a Grand Asia.51 Part of the prob-
lem in the immediate post-war situation was the lack of knowledge of what Pal
actually wrote, and in what context. Pal’s dissent was not published with the
Judgment in Tokyo and only appeared much later in a version published in
5 India.52 Beyond these two readings of his opinion—orientated towards either
TWAIL or revisionist, Nippon (pan-Asian) nationalism—other commentaries
call for heterodox interpretations of Pal’s dissent based on psychoanalysis, re-
ligious philosophy, mythology, and other traditions.53 Milinda Banerjee’s
recent works participate in the same discussions, further situating Pal’s ideas
10 in the frame of theories of sovereignty and decolonisation.54
In terms of the options in Kopelman’s spectrum, Tokyo Trial’s Justice Pal
comes closest to a ‘radical’ using ‘rule of law’ positivism as his weapon: ‘We
cannot arbitrarily impose new international laws’ (episode 3). With regard to
the underlying ideology, Tokyo Trial’s Pal leans on anti-colonialism and anti-
15 imperialism, with hints of pan-Asiatic tendencies. In his discussions with
Ro¨ling, Pal links the trial directly to the question of colonialism. When the
British Justice, Lord Patrick bluntly dismisses Pal’s views in a judges’ meeting:
‘If you cannot follow the Tokyo Charter, you should return to Calcutta’, Pal is
offended and snaps back: ‘I did not come from a country that struggles to gain
20 its independence in order to have my arguments discarded or to be told to go
home’ (episode 2).
My aim here is not to judge whether Tokyo Trial does justice to the his-
torical characters and legal thinkers Pal and Ro¨ling. Should it be the case that
their dissents have been ‘instrumentalised’ for one cause or another, as some
25 might conclude, this would not be the first time. It is more interesting to reflect
upon how the circumstances of their assignment as judges at the IMTFE ren-
dered them easily malleable for such use, and whether that is an inherent char-
acteristic of international criminal justice. Tokyo Trial succeeds in picturing
how the freedom and power of an individual judge may at particular moments
30 have seemed almost limitless or arbitrary. Judges are shown as free agents
51 See Totani (2008) 227-28.
52 Pal also published Crimes in International Relations (University of Calcutta Press, 1955), which
addresses many of the themes of his dissent.
53 See, e.g., A Nandy, ‘The Other Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on
Culpability’ 23 New Literary History (1992) 60; B Hill, ‘Reason and Lovelessness: Tagore, War
Crimes, and Justice Pal’ 18 Postcolonial Studies (2015) 156.
54 M Banerjee, ‘Decolonization and Subaltern Sovereignty: India and the Tokyo Trial’, in K von Lingen
(ed.), War Crimes Trials in the Wake of Decolonization and Cold War in Asia, 1945–1956 (Springer,
2016) 69; M Banerjee, ‘Does International Criminal Justice Require a Sovereign? Historicising
Radhabinod Pal’s Tokyo Judgement in Light of His “Indian” Legal Philosophy’, in Bergsmo,
Cheah and Yi (eds) (2014) 67.
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struggling with their consciences within a legal situation close to tabula rasa,
speaking singularly to the world, and thereby making history. There are some
signs of such hubris in Pal’s and Ro¨ling’s dissents: no cause was too big for them
to decide. As Judith Shklar put it, complimenting how, as compared to the
5 Nuremberg IMT, ‘the dissenters at Tokyo at least gave an ample airing to the
whole issue . . . of the causes of war’.55
Today the situation is strikingly different. With the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, other ad hoc
10 and hybrid tribunals, and the ICC, which has already had several rounds of
elections of judges, the last 25 years must have seen more than 100 international
criminal judges.56 The judges and tribunals have with time become increasingly
bound by a growing corpus of legal rules and case law. Their decisions can be
scrutinised by regular channels of appeal, unlike at the IMT or the IMTFE.
15 There is less scope for an individual judge to improvise and leave their finger-
prints on a particular trial in a manner that becomes subject to widespread and
lasting attention, as was the case for Pal’s and Ro¨ling’s dissents. Rather than
lonely heroes or moral rebels, aren’t international criminal judges today part of
an established legal, political and bureaucratic machinery? Anyone narrating
20 international criminal judges today might prefer to draw on collective processes
in the manner of Pierre Bourdieu or Bruno Latour,57 rather than zooming in on
solitary powerful heroes as Tokyo Trial does. But of what—or whose—(hi)story
are Pal and Ro¨ling the heroes?
OUR PAST, OUR STORY?
25 ‘The following is based on true events’, it is claimed at the beginning of each
episode of Tokyo Trial. Casually invoked in comparable productions, taken at
face value such an assertion ought to trigger serious reflection. What is meant
by ‘true events’ in Tokyo Trial? Certainly, a historical drama does not need to
engage in scholarly discussions, historiography, media studies, or international
30 law.58 There is little sense in treating a docudrama ‘as a book transferred to the
55 JN Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard UP, 1964) 189-90.
56 See, e.g., D Terris, CPR Roman & L Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and
Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (Brandeis UP, 2007).
57 See P Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ 38 Hastings Law
Journal (1987) 814; B Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat, trans. M
Brilman & A Pottage (Polity, 2010).
58 For such discussions with regard to film and history, see, e.g., H White, ‘Historiography and
Historiophoty’ 93 American Historical Review (1988) 1193.
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screen, subject to the same sorts of judgements about data, verifiability, argu-
ment, evidence, and logic that we use for written history’.59 This is not because
one should condescendingly downplay film as a flawed medium, or historical
drama as ‘entertainment’, but because such a point of view assumes that ‘writ-
5 ten history’ itself would be truth cast in stone, as long as some particular dis-
ciplinary criteria were respected. Tokyo Trial is an audio-visual creation; it is not
fruitful to place it in epistemological binary opposition to ‘truth’ as such. The
interest of the truth claim of Tokyo Trial lies rather in its subject-matter: the
series is trying to penetrate the inside of a criminal judgment which itself aims
10 to establish a (judicial) ‘truth’. Tokyo Trial serves its viewers a history of the
production of judicial truth(s) in Tokyo.
In scholarship on international criminal law and ‘transitional justice’, the
expectation of truth is today mostly discussed with regard to victims of crimes:
to what extent do legal procedures allow them to discover ‘the truth’, or express
15 ‘their truths’. A new language of the ‘right to truth’ has recently emerged in
human rights discourse.60 And of course criminal law—and in particular crim-
inal procedure—is supposed to assist in the discovery of ‘true events’ in order to
determine criminal guilt: did the accused commit the crime and should she be
punished for it? Displaying the professional and moral struggles of international
20 judges on screen has little to do with the tragic ordeal of victims or the guilt of
the accused. Yet it is not without importance. Like concentric circles rippling on
water, the question of the ‘true events’ that underpin a major international
criminal trial represented on screen broadens to the ‘truth’ of the specific
acts of violence presented at the trial, and of the criminal responsibility estab-
25 lished by the judgment. At the largest circle, a particular interpretation expands
to a truth about the good or evil of international relations and international law
tout court, based on the good or evil of the acts and politics of particular nations
or peoples.
Watching Tokyo Trial, it becomes evident that its scriptwriters and dir-
30 ectors were aware of the stakes. They have systematically chosen the tactic of a
‘juste milieu’, walking a thin line through the nasty rubble of the past. Any
images of Japanese crimes or verbal evocations of ‘atrocities’ are soon counter-
balanced – a constant tu-quoque and ‘nous aussi’, repeatedly dramatised
through two main techniques. First, by featuring the Japanese suffering,
35 chaos and poverty caused by the war and by the Allies: a glimpse of Japanese
civilians’ poverty and distress; dark silhouettes on chaotic roads; unkempt chil-
59 RA Rosenstone, ‘The Historical Film: Looking at the Past in a Postliterate Age’, in M Landy (ed.),
The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media (Rutgers UP, 2001) 51.
60 See, e.g., P Naftali, La construction du ‘droit a` la ve´rite´’ en droit international (Bruylant, forthcoming).
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dren patiently standing in line for their modest meal; the ruins of Tokyo. A
typical example is Ro¨ling reading his first letter to his wife, Lies, upon his arrival
in Tokyo (a narrative voice-off used recurrently in Tokyo Trial): ‘From here to
Yokohama, there is nothing much left other than ashes and ruins. The hard-
5 ships faced by the people here are almost unimaginable’ (episode 1). Second, by
picturing Japan as the land of a long, refined culture and exquisite natural
beauty: idyllic scenes of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines; traditional gar-
dens and tearooms; and Ro¨ling’s walks on the beach with a wise pacifist writer
character in traditional clothing, representing Michio Takeyama, author of the
10 post-war best-selling novel, Harp of Burma, which was later made into a film.
Looking more closely, carefully steering a middle course raises its own
questions, despite the impression of neutrality. In the series, much of the in-
terpretation of Japanese ‘atrocities’ and guilt seems to hang on a subliminal
comparison with those of the Germans/Nazis, ‘the epitome of absolute evil in
15 Western culture’.61 That issue was certainly in the minds of the judges in Tokyo.
In Tokyo Trial, Justice Bernard, a former member of the French Resistance,
argues, after hearing testimony on crimes committed during the ‘Nanking in-
cident’, that ‘we should adjudicate them as conventional war crimes. There is no
need to categorize them as crimes against humanity, like the Nazis with the
20 exterminations of the Jews’ (episode 2). In legal terms, the issue reduces to the
fact that Japanese ‘atrocities’ did not victimise their own nationals, and could
thus be prosecuted as war crimes. Beyond that, however, Tokyo Trial’s Justice
Bernard also seems to suggest that ‘Japan was not Germany; Tojo was not
Hitler’.62 How to compare what cannot—as is often argued—be represented
25 or even named?63
Watching Tokyo Trial, I could not help wondering how the ‘balance’ of its
historiographical construction would come across if applied to the Nuremberg
IMT and, more broadly, to the criminal responsibility of the Nazis. A distribu-
tion of ‘equal’ blame between the Allies and the Nazis on screen would surprise
30 many. Nevertheless, in today’s Japan, Tokyo Trial appears, if anything, highly
critical of Japanese actions, when compared with many other representations
and interpretations. At the Yu¯shu¯kan war museum next to the controversial
Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, for example, the heroic efforts by the Japanese mili-
tary for their nation in all wars are equally celebrated. Their noble spirits are
61 GJ Simpson, ‘War Crimes: A Critical Introduction’, in TLH McCormack & GJ Simpson (eds), The
Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (Kluwer, 1997) 1, 8-9.
62 Minear (1971) 134.
63 See, e.g., H White, ‘The Modernist Event’, in V Sobchack (ed.), Persistence of History: Cinema,
Television and the Modern Event (Routledge, 1996) 17.
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enshrined at Yasukuni, including those who succumbed to a ‘judicial death’ by
‘enemy nations’ or ‘who killed themselves to take responsibility for’ the war.64
Like many other foreigners, I was intrigued, during my visits to Yu¯shu¯kan, by
the crowds of Japanese gathered to venerate the photos, last letters, and personal
5 objects of kamikaze pilots. A statue of Justice Pal erected next to the museum,
one of several in Japan, bears the concluding words of Pal’s dissent: ‘When time
shall have softened passion and prejudice, when Reason shall have stripped the
mask from misrepresentation, then Justice, holding evenly her scales, will re-
quire much of past censure and praise to change places.’65
10 At the time of Pal’s dissent, similar language was used by others, such as
Freda Utley, in reference to the Nuremberg IMT: ‘If ever the history of our
times comes to be written by scholars free of national prejudices, the “crimes
against humanity” committed by the victors of the second World War of the
twentieth century AD, will appear as equal to those committed by the Nazis.’66
15 Utley was a marginal voice, who declared her intent to present a ‘counter-
narrative’ (though without using that term) as ‘a drop in the ocean compared
to the continuous, and somewhat monotonous, spate of books, articles, news-
paper reports, and radio comment which have by now established an accepted
legend’.67 Steering a middle way through 70 years of controversy, as Tokyo Trial
20 struggles to do, is not a neutral act. It is definitively a choice. If both sides are
equally guilty—or not guilty—the significance of the trial and the judgment is
wiped away. Which party ended up on which side of the bench becomes merely
an uncontrollable twist in the contingency of history, a realpolitikal outcome of
military and diplomatic battles. Does the series underline Pal’s critique of inter-
25 national criminal justice as an exclusively political instrument in the hands of
the powerful? In any case, in Tokyo Trial, a judicial truth has little value.
Much of the impression of ‘true events’ to be conveyed to the viewers of a
historical drama comes down to a question about what is shown and what is
omitted. In a criminal trial, the same logic of framing, delimiting and zooming
64 Records in Pictures of Yasukuni Jinja Yu¯shu¯kan (Yasukuni Shrine, 2009) 84. One of the many
controversies relates to ethnic Korean and Taiwanese imperial service veterans who remain excluded
from any benefits in post-war Japan, whereas the ‘heroic spirits’ of their befallen comrades are
enshrined at Yasukuni against the will of their families: see J Orr, ‘The Politics of Inclusion and
Exclusion in Postcolonial Japan: State, Shrine, and Honor for the Ethnic Veterans, the Fallen, and
Their Bereaved’, in M Lewis (ed.), ‘History Wars’ and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: The Roles of
Historians, Artists and Activists (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) 33 and the documentary Wasurerareta
ko˜gun [Forgotten Imperial Army], dir. N Oshima (1963).
65 Justice Pal concluded his ‘dissentient judgment’ with this (unattributed) quote from Jefferson Davis,
President of the Confederate States of America.
66 F Utley, The High Cost of Vengeance (Henry Regnery Company, 1949) 13.
67 Ibid 302.
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applies. In academic scholarship, the IMTFE has been criticised for much of
that: the unwillingness to countenance a tu-quoque argument with regard to the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the firebombing of Tokyo;
the de facto immunity of high-ranking individuals, in particular the emperor;
5 the superficial efforts to prosecute Japanese colonial crimes; the neglect of the
activities of Unit 731, which conducted medical experiments on humans; the
failure to prosecute the use of poisonous gases against Chinese forces, and so
on.68 Tokyo Trial replicates some of the past silences of the IMTFE, but not all of
them. This also requires a choice. With regard to sexual violence, Tokyo Trial is
10 absolutely silent on it, whereas at the IMTFE rape was prosecuted and con-
demned among other war crimes, contrary to the Nuremberg IMT.69 Even
concerning the IMTFE, however, critics have argued that sexual violence was
insufficiently addressed, and ‘Asian’ victims were neglected.70 Organised sexual
slavery, too, was not addressed by the court (although it was referred to in
15 writing by several prosecutorial teams).71 To quote Helen Durham and Narrell
Morris:
While rape charges were included in the Indictment for use at the
Tokyo Tribunal, no victims of rape were called to give evidence.
Moreover, sexual crimes at the Tribunal tended to be prosecuted
20 euphemistically—as prohibitions against ‘inhumane treatment’, ‘ill-
treatment’ or as ‘failure to respect family honour and rights’—and as
part of ‘larger’ war crimes, such as the ‘rape’ of Nanjing. Most
crucially, the Tribunal failed to address and examine systematically and
comprehensively the sexual enslavement of ‘comfort women’ across
25 Asia.72
In Tokyo Trial, there is no mention—nor is there, as I have pointed out, a
single image—of sexual violence. Nanking is referred to as a place where war
crimes and ‘atrocities’ were alleged to have been committed, so that, at best, it
could be considered that rapes during the ‘Rape of Nanking’ are implicitly
68 For analysis, see Simpson (2011) 31; Totani (2008) 245-50; N Boister & R Cryer, The Tokyo
International War Crimes Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford UP, 2008) 63-64; Boister & Cryer
(eds) (2008) 604 [49 791], 612 [49 815].
69 Boister & Cryer (eds) (2008) 604 [49 791], 612 [49 815].
70 See, e.g., N Henry, ‘Silence as Collective Memory: Sexual Violence and the Tokyo Trial’, in Tanaka,
McCormack & Simpson (eds) (2011) 263. Totani argues that much of the critique is not supported
by the trial records: see Totani (2008) 14, 176-86.
71 See, e.g., Henry (2011).
72 H Durham and N Morris, ‘Women’s Bodies and International Criminal Law: From Tokyo to
Rabaul’, in Tanaka, McCormack & Simpson (eds) (2011) 283.
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included. The other rapes and sexual slavery in the territories Japan attacked
and occupied are not even alluded to. Given the long and public controversy on
the matter both in Japan and abroad, this silence detonates.73
THE LOCATION OF ‘COUNTER’
5 ‘Can war literature stop war?’ So asks Kate McLoughlin in Authoring War, and
leaves the answer open.74 Can films on international criminal trials stop crimes
such as aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity? Do they at least
make a convincing case for the necessity of criminal justice after such crimes?
Why should they? These questions condense the counter-poles of expectation
10 and critique that dominate discussions on film, or more broadly images, and
international criminal justice today. From ‘outreach’, marketing, and fundrais-
ing, to ‘realism’ and ‘criticism/critique’, films vary in their proximity to or
distance from the ideological motifs that underlie the ‘international criminal
justice project’ today.75 The casual truth claims and political choices made in
15 Tokyo Trial invite an interrogation of the series’s underpinnings. At the end of
the last episode, written statements fill the screen, the final ones reporting that
the ICC is ‘strongly criticised by some for not playing the role it is meant to
play. Tumultuous wars and conflicts are still taking place throughout the world’
(episode 4). Despite its adherence to the codes of the genre of historical drama,
20 Tokyo Trial reaches towards today’s international criminal justice—not in order
to join the ranks of the countless audio-visual products that habitually promote
international criminal justice today, but rather to emphasise its shadows. The
majority judges appear besmirched by national politics and at times are con-
descending towards the broader, post-colonial international community advo-
25 cated by Pal, Ro¨ling, and Jaranilla. Victims of Japanese politicians and generals
and their suffering are not in the foreground, whereas the hardships of Japanese
society are brought to view. These choices stir the hidden assumptions, breaking
73 For an insightful comparison between Chinese and Japanese films, see A Weiss, ‘Contested Images of
Rape: The Nanjing Massacre in Chinese and Japanese Films’ 41 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society (2016) 432.
74 K McLoughlin, Authoring War: The Literary Representations of War from the Iliad to Iraq (Cambridge
UP, 2011) 190.
75 See, e.g., C Schwo¨bel, ‘The Market and Marketing of International Criminal Law’, in C Schwo¨bel
(ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014) 264; C
Schwo¨bel, ‘Spectacle in International Criminal Law: The Fundraising Image of Victimhood’ 4
London Review of International Law (2016) 247; I Tallgren, ‘Come and See? The Power of Images
and International Criminal Justice’ 17 International Criminal Law Review (2016) 259.
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the stereotypes of savages, victims, and saviours76 familiar in the genre of films
on international criminal justice, whilst at the same time creating or reinforcing
other stereotypes, such as nationalistic ones. The spectator is invited to reflect
on the objectives of the IMTFE as a whole, and the motivations of its main
5 protagonists, in particular.
By unsettling the spectator into questions and doubts, the series counters
the predominant narrative—at least of the 1990s and 2000s—that international
criminal justice’s main problem has been that there is not enough of it. By
exposing struggles of power and inequality among the judges, Tokyo Trial rup-
10 tures patterns of familiar aesthetics. Pal and Ro¨ling become anti-heroes of inter-
national criminal justice, credited for their courage to question the familiar tale
of humanity’s progress through international law and its institutions, shaped by
the nations exercising political, economic and military dominance. Yet, Tokyo
Trial cannot be so simply pigeonholed. With regard to legal and historical
15 scholarship on the IMTFE in the English-speaking world, Tokyo Trial is not a
new ‘counter-narrative’. Certainly after the publication of Richard Minear’s
Victors’ Justice in 1971, the IMTFE had been the poor cousin of Nuremberg,
either passed over in silence or criticised.77 Only since 2008 has a more nuanced
reading of the IMTFE been audible.78 In Japan, and in Japanese, attitudes have
20 fluctuated.79 The scholarly condemnation of the IMTFE has not necessarily
corresponded in content with Japanese nationalist revisionism. I suspect that
part of the ‘Tokyo bashing’ may have served simply to better glorify Nuremberg.
But critical academic views have at times also furnished nationalist and imperi-
alist protagonists with arguments and credibility.
25 Tokyo Trial may, then, for some viewers work as a reconsolidation of the
myths of the Japanese nation and people rather than a critical history or a
‘counter-history’ of early international criminal justice.80 For others, Tokyo
Trial provides welcome imagery for a ‘TWAIL reading’ of the IMTFE. For
76 M Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ 42 Harvard
International Law Journal (2001) 201; RH Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial
(Princeton UP, 1973).
77 Minear (1973).
78 Totani (2008) and Boister & Cryer (2008), followed by Tanaka, McCormack & Simpson (eds)
(2011).
79 See Totani (2008) 190-262; Futamura (2008) 68-115; and, most recently, M Futamura, ‘Japanese
Societal Attitudes towards the Tokyo Trial: A Contemporary Perspective’ 9 Asia-Pacific Journal:
Japan Focus (2011). See also Lewis (2017).
80 M Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in Logic, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews ed. DF Bouchard (Cornell UP, 1988) 139. See also M Landy, Cinema & Counter-History
(Indiana UP, 2015).
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yet others, the series sings the praises of the international judges for their in-
dependence and courage, moral sheriffs by virtue of law. The sensitivities and
affinities given flesh through the series may appear nationally, regionally and
ideologically situated, speaking for a distant continuation of the antagonisms of
5 war. This is also true for cinema and TV productions that touch upon hotspots
of what Anderson labels ‘cultural memory’.81 For the dialogical processes by
which interpretations and significations are rendered, time matters. Historical
drama surfs the waves of the era of its production. In the post-WWII 1940s or
the post-Cold War 1990s, the international or supranational forces were on the
10 side of the heroes, safeguarding ‘humanity’ against nasty nationalist politics. In
today’s sinister ‘post-mortem modernity’, the national, local and personal may
at times stand for credibility and authenticity, against the immoral or faceless
politics of the international or the obscure financial poles of multinational
power. In that sense, Tokyo Trial is as much a reflection of the concerns of
15 the era of its making as it is a history of the IMTFE, of anti-colonial Justice Pal,
or of avant-gardist Justice Ro¨ling. Yet as Homi Bhabha famously argues, ‘post-
colonial postmodernity’ lives within incommensurable temporalities, or in a
constant time-lag, resistant to attempts at holistic forms of social explanation.82
Perhaps the ambivalence of Tokyo Trial can be credited as a success. For tea-
20 chers of international criminal law, where better to find material for a thought-
provoking course?
CONCLUSION
The issue is man’s future. The shape of that future depends on whether
we can still organize the world more rationally by levelling all national
25 antagonisms, and federate its races, nations and cultures on the sincere
basis of equality of East and West, so that the values of each civilization
complement and reinforce rather than combat and destroy one
another.83
‘Just lately, I have become obsessed with eating a piece of good Scottish
30 beef and a decent Yorkshire pudding. I don’t seem to have an appetite for
anything else at all’, complains Justice Patrick from the UK, sitting at table
with Justice Mei from China who is calmly enjoying an Asian dish with chop-
sticks from a bowl (episode 4). Beyond its cavalcade of caricatures, Tokyo Trial
is also a story of the IMTFE judges as individuals in a difficult profession. Their
81 Anderson (2011).
82 H Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge, 1994).
83 Pal (1955) 426.
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extenuating task in Tokyo drifts along for much longer than planned and grows
more complicated than foreseen, during a period when transport and means of
communication were much slower than today. The Western judges find them-
selves in the empire of the Other in the East, even if it is in ruins and under
5 Western occupation. The first US judge returns home abruptly, discouraged
and offended. The native English speakers, in particular, cling together with
their small talk and drinks, fortifying themselves to face exotic and opposing
views: the scary anti-colonialist Pal, the uncontrollable Ro¨ling.
There are external comforts: a first-class hotel, restaurant meals, service
10 cars, some excursions and concerts. But the judges are far from home. They
have left behind wives—for Mei in the midst of civil war in China—and chil-
dren, beaches, and gardens. They interact and compete in a tense working
environment with constant stress and creeping boredom. As the Soviet judge
puts it: ‘I feel this trial in my backside’ (episode 4). The spectator senses the
15 barriers. The judges are not shown socialising with the Japanese. The only
exception is Ro¨ling’s friendship with the author Takeyama, used by the script-
writers to inject Japanese views of the ongoing trial into the picture. These take
the ‘orientalised’ form of a traditionally dressed Takeyama dispensing wisdom
in a classical tearoom, strolling on the beach, or admiring a Hiroshige print.
20 The foreignness to, and distance from, the local that characterised the
judges in Tokyo marked the flipside of the independence, integrity, and impar-
tiality cherished as the hallmarks of international criminal justice. In today’s
discussions, international criminal trials have their place only when the ordin-
ary national institutions are non-existent or tarnished by bias. In the case of the
25 IMTFE, the judges did not only represent the ‘victorious’ nations of the WWII,
but also the peoples drawn into the war and victimised by it, some more vio-
lently than others. In that sense, they may well have been foreigners, as judges in
Japan, but it would be hard to claim that they had much distance. Despite the
eventual integrity of the individuals concerned, they may have been too close to
30 the war, and to their own national polities, to respect their vow to ‘duly ad-
minister justice, according to law, without fear, favour or affection, and accord-
ing to our consciences’.84
This is one aspect in which Tokyo Trial undoubtedly succeeds: it renders
the sense of complexity, of unavoidable entanglement of interests and loyalties
35 inherent in the situation of the first generation of ‘international’ criminal
judges. Midwives of the ‘discipline of international criminal law’, they were
conscripted to become stars in a spectacle the screenplay for which had been
84 The affirmation stated by the IMTFE judges: see Boister & Cryer (eds) (2008) 701 [46] (Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Ro¨ling).
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dictated from above. The judges were not blind to their condition. Between
messages from capitals, court sessions, and letters to wives, we see them in
Tokyo Trial not at ‘the birth of justice’ but busy with community building:
exchanging with their fellows, sharing past experiences and intimate utopias of
5 an international law to come, and critically analysing the limits of their own role
in it. Torn apart and traumatised by the war, about to be blown open by the
post-war wave of decolonisation, the professional community of international
lawyers was establishing a new field of expertise which the losing side of the war
would soon join. Even if they were divided rather than united, dependent on
10 their political masters rather than free agents, the judges were aspiring to a
professional and intellectual space of their own. At times, the charm of ‘cine-
matographic art’ operates and the judges reach us as they struggle to break out
of their cage in Tokyo 70 years ago, smoking and typing their way into our
lecture rooms and libraries.
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